

Chapter 2

The Functioning of Balance of Power System during the Cold War

Rigid bipolarity characterized the balance of power system that emerged almost immediately after World War II and remained a dominant force throughout the Cold War era. The bipolar model tends to evolve when, for the sake of security needs or ideological or political dependence, states are forced to commit themselves to one side of a power configuration dominated by two great powers. Thus the bipolar world of the Cold War era comprised of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, each dominating the rival military, political, economic and social camps – the NATO depicting the 'Free World' or the 'Capitalist bloc' and the Warsaw Pact alliances, the symbol of 'Communist' respectively.

Walter Lippman in his book *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (1943) stated that "the United States had always been dependent for its security upon the maintenance of a balance of power on the Eurasian continent".⁶⁵ He further mentioned that if Europe and Asia ever fell under the permanent domination of a single hostile state, the resulting concentration of power would be so great that the United States would fail to maintain its independence. Thus the United States should cooperate with 'like minded' states to maintain the balance. With the help of its World War II allies, the United States did succeed in restoring the balance of power in Europe and Asia. By early 1947, most Americans saw the Soviets posing almost as great a threat to the international balance of power as Germany and Japan ever had and felt the need for immediate countervailing action if the global balance of power was not again to be endangered. Amidst this rigid bipolarity evolved in Washington an unprecedented preoccupation with strategy in peacetime, together with a new set of institutions for formulating it.

⁶⁵ Brown, Carl L., *Centerstage: American diplomacy Since World War II*, Homes & Meier Publishers, New York, 1990, p.44.

Scholars however have devised two main reasons to explain what motivated the superpowers to act as they did during the Cold War. One group of scholars argues that the United States and the Soviet Union were primarily interested in protecting and advancing their political systems – i.e. democracy and communism respectively. In other words, these scholars postulate that the Cold War was a battle over ideology (the United States, a believer in capitalism and free market economy and the Soviet Union, a supporter of nationalized and centrally planned economy). Another camp of scholars contends that the superpowers were mainly acting to protect their homelands from aggressors and defend their national interests abroad. These theorists maintain that the Cold War was fought over national self interest.

The Origins of the Cold War: the theoretical contentions

There have been three dominant perspectives on the origins of the Cold War particularly from the historians in the United States. The first was the Orthodox view that held sway in the 1950s and much of the 1960s. It was the product of a society heavily influenced by the breakdown of the wartime alliance and the expansion of Soviet power in Europe, the 'loss' of China to communism, the Korean War, and domestically the rise of 'McCarthyism' with its anti-communist hysteria. Historians argued that it was clearly Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe and then other parts of the world that had caused the Cold War. The United States had no choice but to meet the challenges posed by Soviet actions – whether those actions were seen as the result of traditional Russian imperialism or of an ideologically-driven expansionism that arose, ultimately, from the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Even though Americans had hoped to return to peacetime conditions in 1945 and to continue their wartime cooperation with the Soviets, these expectations were soon dashed by Russian behaviour.⁶⁶

During the 1960s, as the United States became involved in a war in Vietnam, other historians took a different view on the origins of the Cold War as they began to question the motives of the US government and the American business system. The

⁶⁶ Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.46, October, 1967, pp. 22-52.

so-called Revisionists or New Left historians tended to place the blame on the United States rather than the Soviet Union for the start of the Cold War as the end of the wartime alliance need not in itself have led to Cold War. They argued that the Soviets did nothing more in Eastern Europe than any great power would have done in terms of looking after their national interests, especially after two German invasions in less than thirty years. In any event, the Russians were often merely reacting to what the revisionists portrayed as aggressive American demands for business markets and political access into this region. According to the Revisionists, the United States dominated Western Europe and expected to do the same over the Eastern half of the continent despite legitimate Russian security interests. The Revisionists saw US foreign policy as inherently imperialistic and a response to the allegedly insatiable requirements of American capitalism; that in order to survive, it required foreign markets, investments and sources of raw materials – and that these needs, and the need to have political regimes throughout the world that will protect American economic interests, formed the central aims of US foreign policy.⁶⁷

This line of argument by the Revisionists eventually produced a series of counter-arguments by the Post-Revisionists. These historians did not necessarily refute every one of the Revisionist claims at once. They tried to show that both sides had their faults and that over time both superpowers pushed their own interests and misunderstood the other side even to the point, on occasions, of leading to the possibility of nuclear war. (In fact the views that are often regarded as Post-Revisionist have a long pedigree. Realists like Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and William H. McNeill's were interpreting the origins of the Cold War in a 'Post-Revisionist' way even before the Revisionists came along). The Post-Revisionists have tended to accept the Revisionists' view that Stalin was more concerned with Soviet security, and to that end the creation of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe, than with world domination or aggressive ambitions towards Western Europe; but at the same time they have argued that Western leaders at the time could not be certain of what Stalin was up to, that even a Soviet Union preoccupied with what Stalin perceived to be 'security' could still threaten Western interests, and that the Western

⁶⁷ See Paterson, Thomas G, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*, Baltimore, 1973.

powers therefore had legitimate and understandable concerns about Russia. However despite accepting that there were problems on both sides, a number of the Post-Revisionists have also become highly critical of the Soviet Union. John Lewis Gaddis, one of the leading historians in this area, has engaged in what could best be described as a Post-Revisionist /Orthodox interpretation especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of Soviet archives.⁶⁸

Among the three arguments, the Post-Revisionist point of view can be considered as the most justified reason for the origin of the Cold War. Although a war on a global scale did not occur, this period did witness regional conflicts in which the superpowers got involved directly or indirectly through alliances in order to enhance their spheres of influence.

Alliance Formation during the Cold War period

"A description of the international system according to the method of diplomatic history would begin with one observation: never have there been so many alliances concluded in peacetime, never have there been so many organizations, either inter-state (postal union) or transnational (churches, parties of universal vocation) or super-state (European High Commission); never so many military groupings, despite the United Nations, theoretically destined to bring power politics to an end. The United States, long opposed to any external commitment, has become a collector of pacts. Two coalitions, often called blocs, dominate the situation, one led by the United States, the other by the Soviet Union, one officially instituted by the North Atlantic Treaty, and the other by the Warsaw Pact. Everything occurs as if each of the two superpowers had grouped protected or satellite states around itself."⁶⁹

During the Cold War period, which lasted from the mid-1940s until the end of the 1980s, international politics were heavily shaped by the intense rivalry between these

⁶⁸ See Gaddis, John Lewis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997.

⁶⁹ Aron, Raymond, *Peace & War*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA) & London(UK), 2003, p.381.

two great blocs of power and the political ideologies they represented. The principal allies of the United States during the Cold War included Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and Canada. On the Soviet side were many of the countries of Eastern Europe—including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Romania — and, during parts of the Cold War, Cuba and China. Countries that had no formal commitment to either bloc were known as neutrals or, within the Third World, as nonaligned nations.

American journalist Walter Lippmann first popularized the term 'Cold War' in a 1947 book by that name. By using the term, Lippmann meant to suggest that relations between the USSR and its World War II allies (primarily the United States, Britain, and France) had deteriorated to the point of war without the occurrence of actual warfare. Over the next few years, the emerging rivalry between these two camps hardened into a mutual and permanent preoccupation. It dominated the foreign policy agendas of both sides and led to the formation of two vast military alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created by the Western powers in 1949; and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, established in 1955. Although centered originally in Europe, the Cold War enmity eventually drew the United States and the USSR into local conflicts in almost every quarter of the globe. It also produced what became known as the Cold War arms race, an intense competition between the two superpowers to accumulate advanced military weapons.

While the United States accused the USSR of seeking to expand Communism in Europe and Asia, the USSR viewed itself as the leader of history's progressive forces and charged the United States with attempting to stamp out revolutionary activity wherever it arose. In 1946 and 1947 the USSR helped bring Communist governments to power in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland (Communists had gained control of Albania and Yugoslavia in 1944 and 1945). In 1947 United States' President Harry S. Truman issued the Truman Doctrine, which authorized US aid to anti-Communist forces in Greece and Turkey. Later, this policy was expanded to justify support for any nation that the US government considered to be threatened by Soviet expansionism. Known as the Containment Doctrine, this policy, aimed at containing the spread of Communism around the world, was outlined in a famous 1947 Foreign Affairs article

by American diplomat George F. Kennan. Containment soon became the official US policy with regard to the USSR.⁷⁰

“The new American policy was based upon the thesis that the Soviet Union had a persistent tendency to expand the boundaries of its empire wherever possible but would not undertake to do so at the risk of major war. The United States, therefore, by exerting counter pressure, should ‘contain’ the USSR and its Communist satellites within their existing bounds, hoping that time and internal strains would eventually sap the strength of the Red Empire.”⁷¹

By 1948 neither side believed any longer in the possibility of preserving some level of partnership amidst the growing tension and competition. During this new and more intense phase of the Cold War, developments in and around postwar Germany emerged as the core of the conflict. Following its defeat in World War II, Germany had been divided into separate British, French, American, and Soviet occupation zones. The city of Berlin, located in the Soviet zone, was also divided into four administrative sectors. The occupying governments could not reach agreement on what the political and economic structure of postwar Germany should be, and in mid-1947 the United States and Britain decided to merge their separate administrative zones. The two Western governments worried that to keep Germany fragmented indefinitely, particularly when the Soviet and Western occupation regimes were growing so far apart ideologically, could have negative economic consequences for the Western sphere of responsibility. This concern echoed a larger fear that the economic problems of Western Europe—a result of the war's devastation—had left the region vulnerable to Soviet penetration through European Communist parties under Moscow's control. To head off this danger, in the summer of 1947 the United States committed itself to a massive economic aid program designed to rebuild Western European economies. The program was called the Marshall Plan, after the US Secretary of State George C. Marshall.

In June 1948 France merged its administrative zone with the joint British-American zone, thus laying the foundation for a West German republic. Stalin and his lieutenants

⁷⁰ Authorship of the “containment” policy is attributed to George F. Kennan, an US Force Officer. Kennan expounded the general philosophy of “containment” in an anonymous article signed “X” in *Foreign Affairs* (July 25, 1947).

⁷¹ Pratt, Julius W., *A History of United States Foreign Policy*, Princeton Hall Inc., USA, 1980, p.399.

opposed the establishment of a West German state, fearing that it would be rearmed and welcomed into an American-led military alliance. In the summer of 1948 the Soviets responded to the Western governments' plans for West Germany by attempting to cut those governments off from their sectors in Berlin through a land blockade. In the first hint of confrontation between the USSR and the Western powers, the Western governments organized a massive airlift of supplies to West Berlin, circumventing the Soviet blockade. After 11 months and thousands of flights, the Western powers succeeded in making the blockade ineffective. Meanwhile, in February 1948 Soviet-backed Communists in Czechoslovakia provoked a crisis that led to the formation of a new, Communist-dominated government. With this, all the countries of Eastern Europe were under Communist control, and the creation of the Soviet bloc was complete. The events of 1948 contributed to a growing conviction among political leaders in both the United States and the USSR that the opposing power posed a broad and fundamental threat to their national interests.

The Berlin blockade and the spread of Communism in Europe led to negotiations between Western Europe, Canada, and the United States that resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in April 1949, thereby establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Berlin crisis also accelerated the emergence of a state of West Germany, which was formally established in May 1949. (The Communist republic of East Germany, comprising the remainder of German territory, was formally proclaimed in October of that year.) And finally, the Berlin confrontation prompted the Western powers to begin thinking seriously about rearming their half of Germany, despite the divisiveness of this issue among West Europeans.

"The Atlantic Pact is a classical reply to a classical demarche. Just as France, after War, had hoped for an Anglo-American guarantee because the participation of the two Anglo-Saxon powers had been necessary to the victory, similarly the states of Western Europe hoped for an American peacetime commitment, because the United States had contributed decisively to the liberation of the Continent."⁷²

⁷² Aron, Raymond, *Peace & War*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA) & London(UK), 2003,, p.382.

In NATO's early period, member countries jointly planned, financed, and built infrastructure such as bases, airfields, pipelines, and communications networks. The United States provided the largest share of the funding. In 1950 NATO began to set up an integrated military force in Europe under the command from the United States Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. This established the precedent that the military leader of NATO would be an American, while the political leader would be European. In 1955 West Germany, the most populous nation of Western Europe, was admitted to NATO. This alarmed the Soviet Union, which responded by creating the Warsaw Pact, a security alliance made up of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact, formally the 'Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance' was formed in May 1955. To counterbalance this expansion of NATO, the Warsaw Pact set up a mutual defense organization, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, with a unified military command and headquarters in Moscow, which embraced the German Democratic Republic, as well as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and the Czechoslovak Republic. Over the years the military structure of the Warsaw Pact was adjusted to reflect the evolution of Soviet strategy and changes in military technology. During the first decade of the organization's existence, political control over the non-Soviet forces was its principal focus.

"The Soviet leadership's main message to its people and the world was that the Soviet Union had won a 'world historical' victory and no one should minimize its interest. In fact the assertion of a fundamental shift in the correlation of forces in favour of socialism in general and the USSR in particular was a central part of the postwar ideological reformulation. This shift simultaneously justified the quick 'Sovietization' of the Eastern European countries occupied by Soviet power, supported the Soviet's argument for a large role in setting up the postwar arrangements among the great powers, and no doubt reflected a genuine assessment of the situation. ... There was secondary message, however. Stalin and his lieutenants were at pains to remind their people that a new war sometime in the future could not be ruled

out, and the leadership had to concern with the military power of the Soviet state."⁷³

However, following Stalin's death, East European militaries were partly renationalized, including the replacement of Soviet officers in high positions with indigenous personnel, and a renewed emphasis on professional training. The Polish revolt in October of 1956, and the Hungarian revolt that same year, raised serious concerns in Moscow about the reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. On the other hand during NATO's second period (1955–67) of functioning, the alliance emphasized building military strength. Nuclear weapons were the basis of NATO's defense system. This decision was made partly because of the high cost of stationing large numbers of United States troops in Europe and also because of American nuclear superiority in the early stages of the Cold War. NATO's nuclear buildup was seen as a deterrent to war because it assured that a Soviet attack could be met by an overwhelming nuclear response. The alliance was somewhat weakened in 1956 after France and Britain unsuccessfully attempted to take the Suez Canal back from Egypt—an attack that the United States criticized harshly. In 1966 the French government, concerned that the United States was unduly dominating the alliance, withdrew from NATO's integrated military force, though it remained a NATO member and promised to help repel any unprovoked invasion. In addition, many questioned the role of NATO, and some believed that it had outlived its usefulness. In the 1960s the lessons learned from de-Stalinization, as well as Albania's defection from the Warsaw Pact, brought about greater integration of the Warsaw Pact through joint military exercises, intensified training, and the introduction of new Soviet equipment. However the most serious Soviet-American confrontation of the post war era, the Cuban missile crisis, is generally regarded as having arisen from what appear in retrospect to have been quite remarkable misperceptions of each side's intentions by the other.⁷⁴ The most significant reorganization of the Warsaw Pact took place in 1969, including the addition of the Committee of Defense Ministers, the Military Council, the Military Scientific Technical Council, and the Technical Committees. These and subsequent changes allowed increased participation from the East Europeans in decision making,

⁷³ Wohlforth, William Curti, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1993, p.101.

⁷⁴ Gaddis, John Lewis, *The Long Peace*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, p. 225.

and helped the Soviets better coordinate weapons research, development, and production with the East Europeans. In addition to its external defensive role against NATO, the Warsaw Pact served to maintain cohesion in the Soviet bloc. It was used to justify the invasion of Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and again to prepare for an invasion of Poland in 1980 or 1981 if the Polish regime failed to suppress the Solidarity movement.

The third phase of NATO's history (1967–79) was the era of *détente*, a French word that means “the easing of tension.” This was a time of increased cooperation and trade with the Soviet Union and the signing of the strategic arms limitation treaties known as Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II). *Détente* definitively ended in 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, causing many NATO members to believe that Soviet expansionism had begun again. The United States aided Afghan rebels and shifted forces to the Mediterranean Sea and Persian Gulf because of fears of further Soviet actions. The Soviet Union maintained nuclear missile sites in Eastern Europe, and NATO planted new nuclear missiles in Western Europe. The United States and the Soviet Union sent large amounts of military aid to opposing forces in Central America, Africa, and other regions to fund civil wars. In addition, many people throughout the world felt that the renewed focus on strategic weapons was increasing the risk of nuclear war, whether on a global scale or in a limited European war. In the 1980s NATO remained strong militarily, but it was beset with controversies and political problems. Many European members were reluctant to accept new nuclear weapons on their soil, and the United States complained about the cost of stationing hundreds of thousands of its troops in Europe. Meanwhile the United States military spent vast sums building ships, aircraft, and missiles and researching a missile-defense system called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), nicknamed Star Wars. Many NATO allies argued that SDI would violate earlier arms-control treaties and accelerate the arms race.

By the late 1980s, however, the Cold War was winding down as the Soviet Union began to unravel. The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev allowed for greater economic and political freedom in the Soviet bloc, and anti-Soviet independence movements gained strength. The alliance began to unravel with the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* in the Soviet Union, and his attendant redefinition of Soviet-East European relations. Though the alliance was renewed in 1985, as required by the

treaty, deteriorating economic conditions and the rising national aspirations in Eastern Europe put its future in question. The Soviet military attempted to adjust to the shifting political landscape. In 1987 the Warsaw Pact modified its doctrine to emphasize its defensive character, but this and other proposed changes proved insufficient to arrest the decomposition of the alliance. The key development that hastened the Warsaw Pact's demise was the unification of Germany, which constituted an irreparable breach in the Pact's security perimeter. The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and a reunited Germany joined NATO in 1990. The governments of several Warsaw Pact countries soon fell or reorganized along non-Communist principles, drastically changing the political and military balance between Eastern and Western Europe. In July 1990, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO and Warsaw Pact leaders signed a major arms-control treaty and declared that they were no longer adversaries. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991. Under pressure from Eastern Europe, the decision to abolish the military structures of the Pact was taken at a Political Consultative Committee meeting in Budapest in late February 1991; the remaining political structures were formally abolished on July 1, 1991. The overall value of the Warsaw Pact to the Soviet Union during the Cold War remains a point of debate. Clearly, the organization legitimized the continued Soviet garrisoning of Eastern Europe and provided additional layers of political and military control. In addition, the potential contributions of the East European armed forces to Soviet military strategy, as well as the use of the members' territory, were significant assets. On the other hand, throughout the Warsaw Pact's existence, the ultimate reliability and cohesion of its non-Soviet members in a putative war against NATO remained in question. In addition, the declining ability of the East Europeans to contribute to equipment modernization, especially as their economies deteriorated in the late 1970s and 1980s, raised doubts about the overall quality of the Warsaw Pact's armed forces.

"Is it fair to say that the Eastern bloc collapsed under the weight of its own failures and that the West only played a marginal role in its demise? Or was the West, and more specifically NATO, critical to this event? The answer may be rather subtle. As Mastny argues in his superbly researched *Learning from the Enemy: NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact* (Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, Nr. 58, 2001), NATO was not only an adversary but, in many ways, a model of how to address the perennial crisis of

the Warsaw Pact. However, as Mastny illustrates, the various attempts to emulate NATO in the end deepened that crisis."⁷⁵

The difference between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was as obvious as it was crucial. NATO was created at the request of Western European governments and, in spite of the undisputed leadership of the United States, it was a community of equals. By contrast, the Warsaw Pact was a creation of the Soviet Union in which the other members initially had minimal influence. Indeed, when Nikita Khrushchev created the Warsaw Pact in 1955, allegedly in response to the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO, the decision to do so was above all a tactical ploy. By proposing the simultaneous disbanding of both alliances, Khrushchev believed that he could get rid of NATO, while maintaining a system of bilateral defense agreements with Eastern European nations.

Nevertheless, once the Warsaw Pact came into existence, Soviet leaders found it increasingly difficult to resist attempts by Eastern European allies to turn it into a genuine alliance, not unlike NATO. When initial reform efforts failed to generate any tangible results, the inability of the Soviets to accord their allies a more equal status undermined enthusiasm among some Eastern European allies for the newly created alliance. Increasingly, the Soviet Union's Eastern European allies found themselves in a situation in which they were obliged to share the risks involved in Soviet ventures without having a say in managing them. In this way, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Bucharest secretly let it be known to Washington that Romania intended to remain neutral in the event of a nuclear conflict.

While reluctant to give the Eastern European allies more say than necessary, Mastny writes, the Soviets realized the necessity of giving the allies a sense of belonging in the wake of growing Romanian dissent and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.⁷⁶ The results of this ongoing reform were, however, mixed. While trying to satisfy the allies' desire for a more equal alliance, it rapidly became apparent that the Soviets would not be able to give them what they really wanted, namely similar consultation to that

⁷⁵ Lunak, Petr, "Reassessing the Cold War alliances," *NATO Review*, Vol.49, No.4, Winter 2001, pp.31-33.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

which the Western European nations secured through NATO. On the other hand, the Soviets did succeed in educating a Moscow-loyal officer corps by forging a more equal relationship with military establishments in various Eastern European countries. This saved them, for example, from having to invade Poland in the early 1980s, where the immediate crisis was temporarily resolved by the military coup of General Wojciech Jaruzelski. 'When, however, the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, tried to breathe new life into the Eastern bloc, his hope of marrying a Western-style alliance of equals with a revamped Soviet system only exacerbated the crisis of the Warsaw Pact and hastened its demise.'⁷⁷

Raymond Aron observes:

"The military communities of both blocs are due to circumstances, to certain unique considerations, yet do not constitute a break with the ordinary process of international relations. The constitution of the NATO Supreme Command was logical as the result of the risk of general war, as the result of an evident goal (to preserve Western Europe from invasion in case of war), as the result of the military conditions, some temporary (the weakness of the European states), others lasting (the impossibility of the of the operational autonomy of national armies due to the limitations of terrain and the rapidity of movements, on land and in the air). Risk, goal and military conditions are linked to the major fact that is the direct cause of military blocs: the direct impact of the two superpowers in the centre of Europe, the latter being simultaneously the site and the stake of their encounter.'⁷⁸

In fact, "....the Atlantic bloc and the Soviet bloc were formed with a view to waging the Cold War in a period when a hot one was feared. The two blocs continue to be instruments of the Cold War while having as their objective the avoidance of a hot one.'⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Ibid, p.57.

⁷⁸ Aron, Raymond, *Peace & War*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA) & London(UK), 2003,, pp. 382,383.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

The conditions peculiar to the European blocs are not duplicated in any other part of the world. The combined effects of two great European wars had weakened the political and economic domination of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East by European powers. This led to a series of waves of African and Asian decolonization following the Second World War; a world that had been dominated for over a century by Western imperialist colonial powers was now transformed into a world of emerging African, Middle Eastern, and Asian nations. The sheer number of nation states would increase drastically. The Cold War started placing immense pressure on developing nations to align with one of the superpower factions. Both promised substantial financial, military, and diplomatic aid in exchange for an alliance, in which issues like corruption and human rights abuses were overlooked or ignored. When an allied government was threatened, the superpowers were often prepared and willing to intervene. In such an international setting, the Soviet Union propagated a role as the leader of the "anti-imperialist" camp, currying favour in the Third World as being a stauncher opponent of colonialism than many independent nations in Africa and Asia. In this context, the United States and the Soviet Union increasingly competed for influence by proxy in the Third World as decolonization gained momentum in the 1950s and early 1960s. The US government utilized the CIA in order to remove a string of unfriendly Third World governments and to support others.⁸⁰ The United States used the CIA to overthrow governments suspected by Washington of turning pro-Soviet, including Iran's first democratically elected government under Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 (Operation Ajax) and Guatemala's democratically-elected president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954 (Operation PBSUCCESS).

However, many emerging nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America rejected the pressure to choose sides in the East-West competition. In 1955 Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, and Sukarno of Indonesia attempted to unite the 'Third World' against what was seen as imperialism by both the East and the West at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. The consensus reached at Bandung culminated with the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Meanwhile, Khrushchev broadened Moscow's policy to establish

⁸⁰ Ibid.

ties with India and other key neutral states. Independence movements in the Third World transformed the postwar order into a more pluralistic world of decolonized African and Middle Eastern nations and of rising nationalism in Asia and Latin America.⁸¹

On the other hand, the Eisenhower administration attempted to formalize its alliance system through a series of pacts. The US formalized an alliance with Japan and South Korea in early 1950s, guaranteeing Washington long-term military bases; concluded mutual assistance pact with the Republic of China, involving cooperation between them and establishment of American armed forces on the bases; its East Asian allies were joined into South East Asia Treaty organization (SEATO) while friends in Latin America were placed in the Organization of American States. The ANZUS alliance was signed between the US, Australia and New Zealand. However, none of these groupings were as successful as NATO had been in Europe. A rigid anti-communist, John Foster Dulles focused aggressively on Third World politics. He intensified efforts to "integrate" the entire noncommunist Third World into a system of mutual defense pacts in order to cement new alliances. Dulles initiated the Manila Conference in 1954, which resulted in the SEATO pact that united eight nations (either located in Southeast Asia or with interests there) in a neutral defense pact. The US intervention with the greatest ramifications was that in Indochina. Between 1954 and 1961 the administration dispatched economic aid and 695 military advisers to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), which was battling the National Liberation Front (NLF) guerrillas, which drew its ranks from the southern peasantry and was backed by North Vietnam, which in turn was backed by the Soviet Union and China. The RVN would later be absorbed by its Communist counterpart to form the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The original American plan for the Middle East was to form a defensive perimeter along the north of the region. Thus Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan signed the Baghdad Pact and joined CENTO. The Soviet response was to seek influence in states such as Syria and Egypt. Egypt, a former British protectorate, was one of the region's most important prizes with a large population and political power throughout the region. British forces were thrown out by General Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1956, when he nationalized the Suez Canal. Eisenhower persuaded the United Kingdom and France

⁸¹ Pruessen, Ronald W., *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power*, The Free Press, New York, 1982, p. 441.

to retreat from a badly planned invasion with Israel that was launched to regain control of the canal from Egypt. While the Americans were forced to operate covertly, so as not to embarrass their allies, Khrushchev made loud threats against the "imperialists," and worked to portray himself as the defender of the Third World. Nasser was later lauded around the globe, but especially in the Arab world. While both superpowers courted Nasser the Americans balked at funding the massive Aswan High Dam project. The Soviets happily agreed, however, and signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Egyptians.¹⁸

A key event in the South Asian arena of Cold War competition was the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Pakistan and the United States in 1954. This pact would limit the later options of all the major powers in the region. From this point on, the U.S. was committed to remaining closely tied to Pakistan. For Pakistan, the U.S. alliance became a central tenet of its foreign policy, and despite numerous disappointments with it, it was always seen as far too valuable a connection to abandon. After the Sino-Soviet Split, and the US-China rapprochement Pakistan would also pursue close relations with China.

Soviet policy towards South Asia had closely paralleled that of the United States. At first the Soviets, had been largely disinterested in the region and maintained a neutral position in the Indo-Pakistani disputes. With the signing of the accords between Pakistan and the United States in 1954, along with the countries enlisting in CENTO and SEATO, the situation changed. In 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev toured India and promised large quantities of financial aid and assistance in building industrial infrastructure. In Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, the Soviet leaders announced that the Soviet Union would abandon its neutralist position and back India in the ongoing Kashmir dispute. Although the USSR sent India some aid, and although Nehru became the first non-Communist leader to address the people of the Soviet Union, the two nations remained relatively distant. After Khrushchev's ousting, the Soviets reverted to a neutralist position and moderated the aftermath of the 1965 war. Peace negotiations were held in the Central Asian town of Tashkent. In 1969, the two powers negotiated a treaty of friendship that would make non-alignment little more than a pretext. Two years later, when faced with a growing crisis in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), India signed the agreement.

Nationalist movements in some countries and regions, notably Guatemala, the Philippines, and Indochina were often allied with communist groups—or at least were perceived in the West to be allied with communists.⁸² In the course of the 1960s and 1970s, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union struggled to adjust to a new, more complicated pattern of international relations in which the world was no longer divided into two clearly opposed blocs by the two superpowers. As a result of the 1973 oil crisis, combined with the growing influence of Third World alignments such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Non-Aligned Movement, less-powerful countries had more room to assert their independence and often showed themselves resistant to pressure from either superpower. Moscow, meanwhile, was forced to turn its attention inward to deal with the Soviet Union's deep-seated domestic economic problems. Nevertheless, both superpowers resolved to reinforce their global leadership. Both the Soviet Union and the United States struggled to stave off challenges to their leadership in their own regions. President Johnson landed 22,000 troops in the Dominican Republic, citing the threat of the emergence of a Cuban-style revolution in Latin America (Operation Power Pack).⁸³

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was in military terms present in Africa. Each of the superpowers had its main objective to keep out the other. The United States hoped to preserve the greatest possible number of republics from communism, not to establish bases there, nor even to retain markets or sources of raw materials, but simply to channel a tidal wave which would otherwise end by covering the earth.⁸⁴ The Soviet Union applied its usual techniques: propaganda, education of militants in special schools, moral or material aid to the government sympathizing to those in conflict with the West. However the result was not the equivalent of the Sovietization of a European nation. In other words none of the superpowers was successful enough to establish strong alliances in the region.

⁸² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War dated 22.08.2007.

⁸³ Gaddis, John Lewis, *Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History*, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 57.

⁸⁴ Aron, Raymond, *Peace & War*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA) & London(UK), 2003., p.393.

However, the Reagan administration emphasized the use of quick, low cost counterinsurgency tactics to intervene in foreign conflicts. In 1983, the Reagan administration intervened in the multisided Lebanese Civil War, invaded Grenada, bombed Libya, and backed the Central American Contras—right-wing paramilitaries seeking to overthrow the Soviet-aligned Sandinista government in Nicaragua. While Reagan's interventions against Granada and Libya were popular in the US, his backing of the Contra rebels was mired in controversy. In 1985, the president authorized the sale of arms to Iran; later, administration subordinates illegally diverted the proceeds to the Contras.⁸⁵ However, after the weapon sales were revealed in November 1986, President Ronald Reagan appeared on national television and denied that they had occurred.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, the Soviets incurred high costs for their own foreign interventions. Although Brezhnev was convinced in 1979 that the Soviet war in Afghanistan would be brief, Muslim guerrillas waged a surprisingly fierce resistance against the invasion. The Kremlin sent nearly 100,000 troops to support its puppet regime in Afghanistan, leading many outside observers to call the war the Soviets' Vietnam. However, Moscow's quagmire in Afghanistan was far more disastrous for the Soviets than Vietnam had been for the Americans because the conflict coincided with a period of internal decay and domestic crisis in the Soviet system. A high US State Department official predicted such an outcome as early as 1980, positing that the invasion resulted in part from a "domestic crisis within the Soviet system....It may be that the thermodynamic law of entropy has...caught up with the Soviet system, which now seems to expend more energy on simply maintaining its equilibrium than on improving

⁸⁵ Excerpts "From the Iran-Contra Report: A Secret Foreign Policy," *New York Times*, 1994.

⁸⁶ In 1985, while Iran and Iraq were at war, Iran made a secret request to buy weapons from the United States. McFarlane sought Reagan's approval, in spite of the embargo against selling arms to Iran. McFarlane⁸⁶ explained that the sale of arms would not only improve U.S. relations with Iran, but might in turn lead to improved relations with Lebanon, increasing U.S. influence in the troubled Middle East. Speculation about the involvement of Reagan, Vice President George Bush and the administration at large ran rampant. Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh investigated the affair for the next eight years. Fourteen people were charged with either operational or "cover-up" crimes. In the end, North's conviction was overturned on a technicality, and President Bush issued six pardons, including one to McFarlane, who had already been convicted, and one to Weinberger before he stood trial. Although laws had been broken, and Reagan's image suffered as a result of Iran-Contra, his popularity rebounded. In 1989 he left office with the highest approval rating of any president since Franklin Roosevelt. See Wolf, Julie, 'The Iran-Contra affair', *The American Experience: Reagan*, 2000 in <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reagan/peopleevents/pande08.html> dated 20.12.2007.

itself. We could," he construed, "be seeing a period of foreign movement at a time of internal decay."⁸⁷

Box 1: The Alliance Policy of the United States during the Cold War:

The United States maintained alliances during the Cold War period through the conclusion of treaties and defensive pacts which fall into three categories:

Category 1: The North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance: According to the terms of the treaties concluded an armed attack against one or more of the member states in Europe or America shall be considered an attack against them all. 'NATO crafted in 1946 for deterrent purposes, identifies its main aim "as the capacity to resist armed attack" against the territory, armed forces, ships, or aircraft of any member in Europe, North America, Eurasia, Turkey, the North Atlantic Ocean or the Mediterranean Ocean'... Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ... covers... "in the case of conflict between two or more American States", pledges to maintain or reestablishes peace and security'.⁸⁸

Category 2: Collective defensive pacts of Southeast Asia and Middle East:

In South East Asia SEATO is regarded as Cold War military alliance (United States, France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan – SEATO): The treaty between these countries was signed in Manila in 1954 to form the South East Asia Treaty organization. The treaty came into force on Feb. 19, 1955. Pakistan withdrew in 1968, and France suspended financial support in 1975 According to terms of the treaty, instead of proclaiming that an attack against one of the member states would be an attack against all, what is said is that the contracting parties recognize that an attack in the region covered by the pact would endanger their own security.

In the Middle East CENTO (1954) is regarded as the Cold War military alliance (Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, as well as the United Kingdom).

⁸⁷ Maynes, Charles W, "The World in 1980, U.S. Department of State", *Current Policy*, April 1980, pp.1,2.

⁸⁸ Collins, John M, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives*, Brassey's Inc., Dulles, Virginia, 2002, p.241.

The United States joined three years after its formation: Modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, CENTO committed the nations to mutual cooperation and protection, as well as non-intervention in each other's affairs. Its goal was to contain the Soviet Union by having a line of strong states along the USSR's southwestern frontier.

Category 3: **The mutual defense treaties with Japan (1954), South Korea (1953) and Republic of China (1949) and Philippines (1951):** The decisive formula is that an attack against the territory of one of the contracting parties would be dangerous for the peace and security of the other.

- (i) **Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed between the US and Japan** 'focused on defense assistance. It allowed for the presence of U.S. armed forces in Japan for the purpose of peace and security while encouraging Japan to take on more responsibility for its own defense, rearming in a manner suited for defensive, rather than offensive, purposes'.⁸⁹
- (ii) **The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed between the US and the Republic of China** 'to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area'.⁹⁰
- (iii) **Under the 1953 U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States** agreed to help the Republic of Korea defend itself against external aggression.
- (iv) **The Mutual Defense Treaty Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America** was signed and ratified on August 30, 1951 in Washington, D.C. between representatives of the Philippines and the United States. The overall accord dictated that both nations would support each other if either the Philippines or the United States were to be attacked by an external party.⁹¹

⁸⁹ <http://www.learner.org/channel/workshops/primarysources/coldwar/docs/usjapan.html> dated 20.12.2007.

⁹⁰ Source: *United Nations Treaty Series* 1956 (reg. no. 3496), pp. 214-216.

⁹¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_Defense_Treaty_%28US-Philippines%29 dated 20.12.2007.

Box 2: The Alliance Policy of the Soviet Union during the Cold War:

The Warsaw Pact or Warsaw Treaty Organization, officially named the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, was an organization of Central and Eastern European communist states formed to counter the potential threat from the NATO alliance. All the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe (Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania) were signatories except Yugoslavia. The members of the Warsaw Pact pledged to defend each other if one or more of the members were attacked. The treaty also stated that relations among the signatories were based on mutual non interference in internal affairs and respect for national sovereignty and independence.

During the Cold War the Soviet Union has signed mutual assistance treaties against Germany (or the nations allied to Germany) and against Japan (or the nations allied to Japan) and only with states of Communist regime, states of Eastern Europe, Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

The nature of balance of power during the Cold War

The Cold War period witnessed the first true polarization of power in modern history. The world had had limited experiences with bipolar systems in ancient times, it is true: certainly Thucydides' account of rivalry between Athens and Sparta carries an eerie resonance for us today, nor could the statesman of the Cold War era forget what they had once learned, of the antagonism between Rome and Carthage. But these had been regional, not global conflicts: not until 1945 could one plausibly speak of a world divided into two competing spheres of influence, or of the super-powers that controlled them. The international situation had been reduced, Hans Morgenthau wrote in 1948, "to the primitive spectacle of two giants eyeing each other with

watchful suspicion. . . . Thus contain or to be contained, conquer or to be conquered, destroy or to be destroyed, become the watchwords of the new diplomacy."⁹²

Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr believed that states, like human beings, had an innate desire to dominate others, which led them to fight wars. Morgenthau also stressed the virtues of the classical, multipolar balance-of-power system and saw the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as especially dangerous. By contrast, the neorealist theory advanced by Kenneth Waltz ignored human nature and focused on the effects of the international system. For Waltz, the international system consisted of a number of great powers, each seeking to survive. Because the system is anarchic (i.e., there is no central authority to protect states from one another), each state has to survive on its own. "Waltz argued that this condition would lead weaker states to balance against, rather than bandwagon with, more powerful rivals. And contrary to Morgenthau, he claimed that bipolarity was more stable than multipolarity."⁹³

Classical realism typically starts with a pessimistic notion of human nature. Self interested, competitive, and power-hungry behavior is seen as rooted deeply in the human condition. Hans Morgenthau argues that to preserve itself, each state must act selfishly. He concluded that this behaviour trend normally leads to conflict. Then to establish their international strategy a prudent statesmen should avoid optimism about others' goals and should limit their objectives to those that they can sustain if things go badly. In short, classical realism assumes that competition and conflict between actors are inevitable, and the roots of the struggle for power come from the human nature. Given this scenario of states behavior, classical realists often emphasize the importance of organizing individuals units into groups that can protect their members through a focus on improving the group's relative power position over others.

Neorealism or structural realism takes a different approach to explain the nature of the conflict between actors in international relations. It considers interstate conflict rooted in the absence of a central authority that can enforce rules and agreements, absence that generates an insecure, self-help situation in which all policy makers are pressured to act competitively, regardless of their individual natures or personal preferences.

⁹² See Morgenthau, Hans J., *Politics Among Nations*, Mc Graw - Hill, New York, 1948.

⁹³ Little, Richard and Smith, Michael, *Perspectives on World Politics*, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 387.

This situation is called anarchy, not in the sense of chaos but in the sense of absence of world government which can enforce rules in international relations. In short, anarchy generates an insecure international system, and the states must act to eliminate or reduce this insecurity. All states have two choices to resist possible domination by others:

- Through a policy of balancing against others' power capabilities,
- Bandwagoning a coalition that supports an aggressive state, in hopes of turning its aggression elsewhere.

But large states have also the capacity, and often the willingness, to resist the strength of others, in other words they do not need to bandwagoning a coalition, they can lead a coalition. This results in a competition for power among the major states regardless of their leaders' views or the nature of their domestic political systems.

The first great difference between these two brands of realism lies in approach:

Both realisms expect policy makers to act competitively, but the difference lies in the way that they arrive to this conclusion. Classical realism considers that the behaviour of the states originates power oriented strategies because statesmen's desire of power as an end in itself, whereas neorealism set the arise of such strategies in the need to compete for security.

These two different roots of behaviour lead us to the second key difference between neorealism and classical realism: the equilibrium point. What is the answer for the question about the effect of polarity on war and peace. Which is safer (from major war and domination) a world of two great powers or many medium powers? The key is centered on the impact of uncertainty, and the effect that it has on decisions to go to war. Uncertainty increases when the number of main actor is higher in the international system and diminish when that number decreases. This is because with more actors playing a main role in the system, the number of different future potential scenarios increases and vice versa. For classical realists states strategies are rooted in the human desire of power as an end in itself, then certainty leads to war because certainty simplifies the aggressors' calculations for war, and uncertainty leads to peace because action is deterred by the threat of third party intervention. Bipolarity gives more certainty than multipolarity, therefore multipolarity leads to peace in the classical

realist theory. On the other hand neorealism submits strategies to the need to compete for state security, and the insecurity is originated in the anarchic condition of the international realm which imposes the accumulation of power as a systemic requirement on states to give more security themselves. When the number of main actors is increased the system is more anarchic and therefore more insecure. Then the states tend to take more drastical decisions to reduce insecurity, in other words uncertainty gives more opportunities to aggressor to act and certainty leads to peace because there are fewer wars that are caused by miscalculation. Bipolarity gives more certainty than multipolarity, therefore bipolarity leads to peace in the neorealist theory. So since the main statements appear to be similar, realism and neorealism are very different theories, and each one gives us different snapshots of the same international system.

Neorealism explains puzzling state behaviors better than previous realist theories. For example it gives a proper answer to the question of why do states resist the specialization which economic theory demonstrates has comparative advantages. Neorealism says that this is because while wealth may grow absolutely, states must focus on security, which requires avoiding reliance on others. Neorealism also explains why both superpowers were obsessed with minor allies such as Vietnam (the intrinsic stakes mattered far less than the issue's impact on others and the balance between superpowers - "domino theory"), while France's defection from NATO mattered little. The answer to this puzzle is that in alliances among unequals, the contributions of lesser members are at once wanted and of relatively little importance.

Classical Realism could not explain why the Cold War system had not led to open warfare. Morgenthau's theory establishes that multipolar systems are believed more stable (less "war prone") than a bipolar one. But for neorealists a bipolar system is more stable, this explain why the Cold War endured without direct conflict. Waltz's theory provides answers to the Cold War's basic questions and gives statesmen both decision-making and strategical guides. According to neorealism, the Cold War was the inevitable consequence of the emergence of two superpowers as the result of World War II. Each necessarily had to fear the other's capabilities, regardless of intentions, ideologies, etc. Further, since each superpower possessed extensive resources and could be expected to take whatever action necessary to preserve its relative status,

the Cold War could be expected to be enduring. The theory prescribes to statesmen to accept bipolarity as the best of possible worlds, and to resist futile efforts to change it.

According to neorealism an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others. The term "security dilemma" describes the condition in which states, unsure of others' intentions, arm for the sake of security, setting in motion a vicious circle of response and counter-response. Security dilemmas result from situations, not states' desires. US and Soviet forces in Europe during the Cold War met the conditions of a security dilemma. Neorealism suggests that two bipolar great powers share interests in acting to maintain the international system, rather than to transform or transcend it. According to neorealism three possibilities are available to restrain an unstable arms race, and each was used in part during the Cold War. States may accept the risks of insecurity, balancing it against the domestic risks associated with higher defense costs. Tactical nuclear weapons may be deployed to link strategic nuclear deterrence to theatre forces. Cooperation in arms control can limit the most threatening weaponry and help reduce suspicions by making each side's actions more visible to the other.

To many bipolarity of the Cold War era may seem an awkward and dangerous way to organize world politics. Simple geometric logic would suggest a system resting on three or more points would be more stable than one resting upon two. However politics is not geometry: the passage of time and accumulation of experience has made clear certain structural elements of stability in the bipolar system of international relations that were not present in the multipolar systems that preceded it;

- The postwar bipolar system realistically reflected the facts of where military power resided during the entire Cold War period. In this sense it differed markedly from the settlement of 1919, which made so little efforts to accommodate the interests of Germany and Soviet Russia. It is true that in other categories of power, essentially economic, some states were in the position of challenging or even surpassing the Soviet Union and the United States in the production of specific commodities. But as political position of nations like West Germany, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong suggests, the economic capabilities of these countries were yet to translate into approaching the capacity of Washington or Moscow to shape events in the world as a whole in the post World War II era.

- The post 1945 bipolar structure was a simple one that did not require sophisticated leadership to maintain it. The great multipolar systems of the 19th century collapsed in large part because of their intricacy: they required a Metternich or a Bismarck to hold them together, and when they lacked statesmen of that caliber they tended to come apart. Neither the Soviet nor the American political systems rested on the identification of statesmen of comparable prowess and efficiency. It is because of the involvement of inescapably high stakes for the two superpowers inducing each other in a sense of caution and restraint, the bipolar structure of international relations, regardless of the personalities involved, remained apparently in a more or less stable position than the multipolar situation.
- Because of its relatively simple structure, alliances in this bipolar system have tended to be more stable than they had been in the 19th century and in the 1919-39 period. It is striking to consider that the NATO has equaled the most durable pre World War I alliances, that between Germany and Austria – Hungary; it has lasted almost twice as long as the Franco-Russia alliance, and certainly much longer than any of the tenuous alignments of the interwar period. Its principal rival, the Warsaw Pact alliances, has been in existence almost as long. The reason for this is simple; alliances actually are the product of insecurity and so long as the Americans and the Russians remained insecure of each other and considered the other and their respective clients the major source of danger in the world, neither superpower did not have much difficulty in maintaining the coalitions it controlled. In a multipolar scenario, the sources of insecurity can vary in much more complicated ways; hence it is not surprising to find alliances shifting to accommodate these variations.
- The overall stability of the basic alliance systems of the bipolar world contributed in peaceful defections from both the American and the Soviet coalitions (China, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, in the case of the Americans; Yugoslavia, Albania, Egypt, Somalia and China , in the case of Russians) without being major disruptions that might not would have been possible in a more delicately balanced multipolar arrangement. It is however curious consequence of bipolarity that although alliances are more durable than in a multipolar system, defections are at the same time more tolerable.

If the structure of bipolarity in itself encouraged stability, so too did some of the inherent characteristics of the bilateral Soviet-American relationship. It used to be fashionable to point out that before the Cold War days had begun, despite periodic outbreaks between the United States and the Soviet Union had never actually gone to war with one another. This however could not be claimed for the history of either country's relations with Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Japan or France. Thus notable historian Foster Rhea Dulles noted in the wake of the first meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin in 1943, "its roots were so deep in the past, and that it had developed through the years out of common interests transcending all other points of difference, marked the effort toward a new rapprochement as conforming not only to the immediate but also to the long-term interests of the two nations."⁹⁴

The onset of the Cold War made this argument seem less convincing. But even after the breakdown of cordiality between the two superpowers there had been no outbreak of Russian-American war during the Cold War period despite having ideological differences and each of its ambition of expanding its sphere of influence throughout the world in order to emerge as the leading hegemonic power. This raises the obvious question was the bipolar world of the Cold War era a testimony of stability in international relations? Was a state of equilibrium maintained by the superpowers through alliance formations in their international balance of power? Apparently the answer would be 'yes' as no war was fought between the two superpowers during the period. Now the question is how this balance of power was maintained?

Stability in international system is only partly a function of structure, though; it depends as well upon the conscious behavior of the nations that make them up. Even if the World War II settlement had corresponded to the distribution of power in the world, even if the Russian-American relationship had been one of minimal interdependence, even if domestic constraints had not created difficulties, stability in the postwar era still might not have resulted if there had been, among either of the dominant power in the system, the same willingness to risk war that existed at other

⁹⁴ See Dulles, Foster Rhea, *America's Rise to World Power, 1898-1954*, Harper Publishers, University of Michigan, USA, 1955.

times in the past.⁹⁵ Thus it has to be acknowledged that statesman of the post-1945 superpowers have, compared to their predecessors, been exceedingly cautious in risking war with one another. In order to see this point, one need only a retrospective glance at the list of crises in Soviet-American relations since the end of World War II: Iran, 1946; Greece, 1947; Berlin and Czechoslovakia, 1948; Korea, 1950; the East Berlin riots, 1953; the Hungarian uprising, 1956; Berlin again 1958-59; Berlin again, 1961; the Cuban missile crisis, 1962; Czechoslovakia again, 1968; the Yom Kippur war, 1973; Afghanistan, 1979; Poland, 1981; the Korean airliner incident, 1983 – one just need run down this list to see how many occasions there have been in relations between Washington and Moscow, that would have otherwise produced war in almost any other era or age.

The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States had neither been free from ideological rivalries nor had they stopped fighting over their national self interest during the Cold War era. In spite of that we find that the bipolar world of the post World War II days produced stability in international arena. What we mean by this is that since during the Cold War days as no open war was as such fought between the Russians and the American, it can be concluded in an apparent manner that the balance of power was maintained between the two superpowers. The reasons can be depicted in the following fashion:

- (1) *Respect spheres of influence*: Neither Russians nor Americans officially had any demarcated spheres of influence, yet the history of the Cold War confirms the efforts of each to consolidate and extend them. In acknowledging this one should not ignore their obvious differences: the American sphere was wider in geographical scope than its Soviet counterpart, but it had also been a much looser alignment, participation in which had often than not been a matter of choice rather than coercion. But what is important is that although neither side had ever publicly endorsed the other's right to a sphere of influence, neither had ever directly challenged it either. Thus despite publicly condemning it, the United States never attempted seriously undo Soviet control in Eastern Europe; Moscow reciprocated by tolerating, though never openly approving of,

⁹⁵ Gaddis, John Lewis, *The Long Peace*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982., p. 229.

Washington's influence in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, the South East Asia, and Latin America.⁹⁶

(2) *Avoid direct military confrontation* : It is remarkable, in retrospect, that at no point during the long history of the Cold War have Soviet and American military forces engaged each other directly in sustained hostilities. The superpowers had fought three major limited wars since 1945, but in no case with each other: the possibility of direct Soviet-American military involvement was greatest – although it never happened - during the Korean War; it was more remote in Vietnam and had remained so in Afghanistan as well. In those few situations where Soviet and American military units had confronted one another directly – the 1948 Berlin blockade, the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis in the following year – great care was taken on both sides to avoid incidents that might have triggered hostilities.⁹⁷

(3) *Use nuclear weapons only as an ultimate resort*: One of the most significant tradition that had evolved since 1945 was that of maintaining a sharp distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, and of reserving the military use of the latter only for the extremity of total war. In retrospect, there was nothing at all inevitable about this: the Eisenhower administration announced quite publicly its willingness to use nuclear weapons in limited war situation; Henry Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* strongly endorse such use in 1957 as a way to keep alliance commitments credible; and Soviet strategists had traditionally insisted as well that in war both nuclear and conventional means would be employed. But in spite of such proclaimed doctrines, throughout the history of Cold War days there was no single situation where the superpowers deployed for use nuclear weapons.⁹⁸

The above three factors can be considered as 'superpower rules' that were followed during the Cold War period which according to them contributed to stability in the international arena, resulting in the formation of a perfect balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

The Soviet-American competition had in fact gone forward simultaneously in several parallel arenas. The first of these is the strategic theatre which entailed nuclear proliferation and the resultant arms race between the superpowers. However, it was the deterrence strategy that deterred each superpower from making a nuclear attack on the other, thereby maintaining the global balance of power; the second encompasses the Eurasian landmass, primarily Europe in the West and northern Asia in the East where each superpower tried to maintain its dominance.; and the third arena might simply be labeled the 'periphery' or the 'third world' where the United States wanted to check any kind of Soviet expansionist policy and to block the growing influence of communism and support moderate nationalists in the colonial empires. A brief review of how balance of power functioned in each of these arenas follows.

The Strategic Balance: The directions of events in the strategic theatre can be summed up quite simply. From the late 1940s to the late 1950s there was growing concern over the possibility of an attack on the United States by Russian bombers carrying first atomic and then even more destructive thermonuclear weapons. Several steps were taken to meet this threat directly, including the deployment of an extensive early warning radar network backed by a force of jet fighter interceptors and surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles. In 1957 the Soviets launched the first earth-orbiting satellite and seemed suddenly to be on the brink of deploying a force of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBM). The United States military responded by giving missile development programs the highest national priority, and several spy aircraft and reconnaissance satellites were designed and deployed to check on Soviet progress. The doctrine of massive retaliation thus became the key feature in US military which would henceforth rely less on conventional forces and more on nuclear firepower.

Issues came to a head during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The Soviet Union placed medium range missiles ninety miles from the US --a move considered by many as a direct response to American Jupiter missiles placed in Turkey; however, these Jupiter missiles were already somewhat obsolete. After intense negotiation, the Soviets ended up removing the missiles from Cuba and decided to institute a massive building program of their own. In exchange, the US dismantled its launch sites in Turkey although this was done secretly and not publicly revealed for over two decades. Khrushchev did not even reveal this part of the agreement when he came under fire by political opponents for mishandling the crisis. By the late 1960s the

number of ICBMs and warheads was so high on both sides that either the US or USSR was capable of completely destroying the other country's infrastructure. Thus a balance of power system known as mutually assured destruction (MAD) came into being. Mutual assured destruction is a doctrine of military strategy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by one of two opposing sides would effectively result in the destruction of both the attacker and the defender. It is based on the theory of deterrence according to which the deployment of strong weapons is essential to threaten the enemy in order to prevent the use of the very same weapons. The strategy is effectively a form of equilibrium, in which both sides are attempting to avoid their possible outcome – nuclear annihilation.

In the late 1960s the United States and the USSR initiated negotiations to regulate strategic weapon arsenal. These negotiations became known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) which produced two agreements in 1972: the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) which 'drastically limited the establishment of defensive installations designed to shoot down ballistic missiles'⁹⁹ and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The SALT II negotiations which began in 1972 produced another treaty in 1979 that would limit the total number of the US and the USSR missile launches.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) started in 1983 was a research programme for developing a defense against ballistic missiles appeared likely to undermine the ABM Treaty and challenged the assumptions of nuclear strategy since the beginning of the arms race. 'Since the late 1940s both deployment of nuclear arms by the superpowers and restrictions upon their use had been founded upon a theory of deterrence. According to this theory, the mutual likelihood of destruction in the event of a nuclear confrontation between the US and the USSR preserved a delicate balance between the two superpowers. Stable relations between the nations required that they possess a roughly equal capacity to harm each other.'¹⁰⁰ Critics of SDI believed that efforts to construct a defense against nuclear weapons would destroy that balance and remove the conditions that prevented nuclear weapons from being used. These concerns led to the resuming of US-Soviet arms negotiations in 1985 that led to the signing of the

⁹⁹ <http://www.slmk.org/larom/larom/introduktion/introduktion.html>. dated 22.09.2007.

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.slmk.org/larom/larom/introduktion/introduktion.html>.dated 22.09.2007.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. The INF Treaty eliminated an entire class of ballistic missiles and established a 13 year programme to verify compliance. Thus throughout the Cold War era a strategic balance was maintained between the superpowers that prevented from the outbreak of any thermonuclear holocaust.

The Global Balance of Power: Protecting Western Europe from Russian domination became the primary objective of American foreign policy and military strategy during the post World War II period. Thus continued US participation in the balance of power in Europe became shortly after the war the first condition for the establishment of that international stability that they deemed essential to the security and prosperity of America.

What are the principal points to be made about America's European policy during that period? In the Cold War system, much of which is still intact, the United States obviously played a central role; within the Western bloc, the US clearly *was* the dominant power; within the Western world, America *was* a kind of "hegemon." The interesting question is not whether this was the case: the interesting question has to do with why this situation developed. Was it because the United States wanted to extend its power to whatever extent it could—that it wanted to construct a kind of American empire in the western half of Europe? Does the fact that America ended up playing that kind of role simply be taken as self-explanatory—is it to be assumed that the emergence of this system does not really need to be explained through a detailed historical analysis, because this is simply the way international politics works, that is simply what great powers do? Such assumptions are very common—de Gaulle, for example, often explained American policy in such terms—but that kind of interpretation can really stand up to close historical analysis.

The Americans were simply not intent, from the very outset, in setting up a US-dominated system in Western Europe. In the late 1940s, the Americans were not quite sure what sort of system they wanted to see take shape in Europe. They knew they wanted to keep the Soviets from dominating the entire continent, and that this meant there had to be a counterweight to Soviet power in Europe, but it was by no means clear that that counterweight had to be based permanently on American military power. To be sure, as people saw the problem in the late 1940s and 1950s, a certain American troop presence on the continent was certainly necessary for the time being, but it was unclear whether the Americans would have to stay in Europe

indefinitely. It was unclear, that is, whether a European counterweight to Soviet power could ever actually come into being. Indeed, that possibility was taken quite seriously—more seriously by the Americans than by the Europeans themselves—and this explains incidentally why the Americans were so interested in European unification: they wanted the Europeans to come together, because they themselves were looking for a way to get out.¹⁰¹

To be sure, the Truman administration, in July 1951, reached the conclusion that there was no way to get out—no viable alternative to the U.S.-dominated system, the idea that the Europeans ultimately had to provide for their own defense, and that the United States could not carry the defense burden forever was placed at the absolute center of American policy by the new Eisenhower administration in 1953. Eisenhower was intent on making Europe into what he called a “third great power bloc” in world affairs; he wanted the Europeans in the final analysis to be able to balance Soviet power on their own, without direct American support; he understood that this meant that the Europeans would have to be armed with nuclear weapons, including long-range strategic nuclear weapons, and he wanted to help them develop forces of that sort.

Eisenhower’s policies were resisted for all sorts of reasons, and by the time he left office in 1961, he had not been able to bring a system of this sort into being. And the next administration, the Kennedy administration, had no interest in continuing the Eisenhower policy. The Eisenhower policy implied that the Europeans would have nuclear capabilities under their own control; this meant in particular that West Germany would have a nuclear force under its own control. This was unacceptable in large part because of the presumed Soviet reaction if it ever became clear that the Germans were developing nuclear forces of their own. In particular, the Kennedy administration from the very start was against the idea of a nuclear Germany. But it understood that if the Germans were to be kept non-nuclear, the Americans could not withdraw from central Europe: Germany had to be defended, and if they were not going to provide for their own defense, the United States would have to do it for them: only American power, in such a case, could serve as an effective counterweight to Soviet power in central Europe. But if this was the case, it followed, from the

¹⁰¹ www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/ISA.doc dated 28.09.2007.

Kennedy administration point of view, that the Americans had to set policy for the West as a whole. European security was being underwritten by the United States; the Americans were putting their own cities at risk for the sake of Europe; in exchange, the Americans felt that they could not be expected to defer to the Europeans on key political matters (relating above all to relations with the Soviet bloc), but instead had to control at least the western side of the political process that might culminate in war with the USSR.

The Americans were reaching for a system based on American power, and that inevitably meant a U.S.-dominated system. It is not that the alternative—the Eisenhower policy—did not in principle make sense in power political terms. Empire is a burden, and it is always easier to balance between two rival powers (or blocs of powers) than to hold one half of the balance oneself. “Balancing between” is a more effective policy, more efficient in its use of power, than “balancing against.” I think the whole of Waltz argument that an independent West European super state as a “third great power” would not have been in America’s interest is fundamentally mistaken: in pure power political terms, the Americans would have profited from a situation that allowed them to “relax somewhat” and hold the balance in world politics, just as America profited from the emergence of China as a counterweight to Soviet power in another part of Eurasia.¹⁰² The problem was that super states of that sort cannot be just brought into being given political realities during that whole period, any purely European security system would have to be based on the nation-states as they were. A purely European defense system thus meant nuclear forces under the ultimate control of the European states, no matter what cooperative arrangements were worked out for knitting those forces together; it meant in particular nuclear forces under German control. The presumed instability instead had to do with a situation where the Communists still controlled half of prewar German territory—and with a situation where the Germans, no longer dependent on America for protection, would no longer be locked into a status quo policy in Europe.

As for America, perhaps the key point to note was that during the Cold War the Soviet counterweight served as a source of discipline—that is, it served to constrain American policy in important and valuable ways—and the disappearance of that counterweight has created a certain disequilibrium—that America has become too powerful for the

¹⁰² Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979, pp.201, 203.

world's good, and probably for its own good as well. As Waltz wrote in 1979: "one may fear the arrogance of the global burden-bearers more than the selfishness of those who tend to satisfy their own narrowly defined interests"¹⁰³ In his view—and this point somewhat cuts against his well-known argument about the superiority of bipolarity over multipolarity—there was value in a system in which no state enjoyed too great a margin of power of its rivals.

Since the end of the Second World War, American foreign policy in Northern Asia was aimed at preserving an independent Japan. From the early 1950s the American military position had been anchored in Japan and Korea with a logistical tail trailing back through the Philippines, Hawaii and connecting finally to the West Coast of the continental United States. But three crucial developments or trends that that soon followed seemed likely to affect America's place as a Pacific power.

The first was of course the split between China and the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet split was clearly the significant political development of the postwar period. Over the long run it had denied the Soviet Union access to vast potential resources with which it might have been able to improve its position relative to the United States.¹⁰⁴ More immediately it also created pressing military requirements that the Soviets had encountered and had to pay a great deal to meet. This was a second important trend. Since the mid 1960s, when their differences with the Chinese began to deepen, the Soviets got engaged in a major military buildup in the Far East. Soviet forces started operating out of American-built facilities in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Soviet submarines and surface vessels patrolled the access to Japan and their aircraft regularly overflew the northern portion of the Japanese homelands. The increasing Soviet presence there had diminished the relative advantage that the US forces once enjoyed in the region. This was a third significant trend. In 1969 the Nixon administration revised downward the assumption that the US conventional forces had to be big enough to fight "two-and-a-half wars" simultaneously, one in Europe, one in Asia, and another brushfire" conflict on the periphery. Given the continued focus of American policy on Europe and the increasing importance of the Persian Gulf, the regular peacetime American

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.205.

¹⁰⁴ Brown, L. Carl, *Centerstage: American Diplomacy since World War II*, Homes & Meier Publishers, New York, 1990, p. 68.

presence in Asia had dwindled since the end of the Vietnam war.¹⁰⁵ Though the American military presence in Asia started shrinking, the Nixon administration brought a new turn in American foreign policy. While the Sino-Soviet relationship started deteriorating on the one hand, the beginning of 1970s saw the improving of Sino-US relations. Thus while the regional military balance of power between the superpowers was reclining in the favour of the Soviets, the US interest in the region was of no less importance. The Sino-US rapprochement and the cordial relation between the US and Japan explain the paramount influence of the United States in the region.

The involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in the affairs of the Third World politics during the Cold War can be viewed from two different perspectives according to David Skidmore: *the degree of involvement* and *the nature and characteristics of involvement*.

The degree of involvement: In multipolar systems according to balance of power theory, great powers seek out allies as their crucial component of their balancing strategies. Under bipolarity, however, balancing depends more heavily upon the mobilization of internal resources. Bipolar rivals are likely to balance through arms racing. Allies recede in importance because the overall balance is little affected by the addition to or deletion from one side or the other of relatively weak secondary powers.

From this perspective, it is therefore difficult to explain why both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened so deeply and persistently strategically and economically the peripheral regions of the Third World during the Cold War. For the duration of the Cold War era more generally, the United States allowed itself to be drawn into military conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere, despite prospect of costs disproportionate to the direct strategic or economic interests actually at stake. The Soviet Union followed a similar pattern in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁶

The nature and characteristics of involvement: If the degree of American and Soviet interest and intervention in the Third World is difficult to explain from a balance of power perspective, how consistent with balance of power theory was the nature and character of that intervention? The answer, in short, is that both the United States and

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Skidmore, David, *Contested Social Orders and International Politics*, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1997, pp.167, 168.

the Soviet Union were far more concerned with exercising influence over the domestic social orders of Third World countries than can be accounted for balance of power theory. Clearly, both powers acted upon the assumption that the alliance choices of such states depended far more on the domestic character of the regime in question and the degree of superpower penetration than upon simple geopolitics.¹⁰⁷

A plausible explanation of American policy in Third World can be accomplished on the basis of three logics: (i) to block communism, support European allies (ii) to block communism, support moderate nationalist movements in the colonial empires (iii) to maximize American economic interests, increase American access to markets and raw materials in the colonial empires.

The two anticommunist logics were dominant throughout the postwar period; the weight of American economic interests is difficult to estimate over time because those interests could be maximized in some cases by supporting the European colonial powers against radical nationalists or communists and in other instances by supporting pliable moderate nationalists against mercantilist European colonialists.¹⁰⁸ From the earliest stages of the Cold War, the United States had always displayed some interest in protecting friendly Third World regimes, both from hostile neighbors (often backed by the Soviets) and from internal enemies. American support had manifested itself in variety of forms, from the provision of military hardware to the design and implementation of counterinsurgency programs. The importance of this second instrument of policy increased steadily from the early 1950s to the early 1960s, when increasing numbers of American counterinsurgency advisers were trained and dispatched to various parts of the world, to the middle and late sixties when substantial US forces were committed to combat in South East Asia. However, after the disastrous experience of the American military intervention in Vietnam, with exception of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, it was expected that the United States would no longer get involved in any kind of war in the periphery. In the eighties the United States reversed roles and got involved in the insurgency business, supporting guerilla movements of various ideological stripes against Soviet backed regimes.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Brown, L. Carl, *Centerstage: American Diplomacy since World War II*, Homes & Meier Publishers, New York, 1990, p.113.

The Soviet Union had also gone through several stages in its development as a world power, able to throw its weight around on the periphery. From acting as an enthusiastic supporter of national liberation movements, the Soviets had been drawn increasingly into propping up a few favoured client regimes to and in several cases protecting them from their American backed internal oppositions. 'For a time in the mid seventies it seemed that the Soviets might be on the verge of replacing a retiring, war weary United States... but whatever enthusiasm there may have been in the Soviet Union for such adventures appears to have been cooled...by the long and bloody aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan..³⁶

The superpower competition on the periphery seemed to have reached a plateau of sorts. Events in those areas of course always had a logic of their own and they went forward regardless of what the either country did. Both the superpowers did pay a modest price to protect their friends in distant places and to exploit each other's weaknesses and obsessions. So does the superpower involvement in the Third World politics through alliance formation was not in parity with the principles of balance of power mechanisms? If we consider David Skidmore's views then the answer is definitely 'no' as in bipolarism the balance of power functions through arms race; alliance formation is not a necessary prerequisite for maintaining a balance in a bipolar world. Nonetheless the superpowers functioned in the Third World arena through alliance politics. So was there no balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union in the region? Was the situation an anarchic one due to superpower involvement in the regional conflicts? Answers to these questions will be explored in chapters four and five with case studies in a specific region of the Third World –the South East Asia and the South Asian region.

Box 2: The Balance of Power System during Cold War

Nature: Bipolarity – US depicting symbol of 'capitalism' or the 'free world' and Soviet Union representing 'communism'.

Alliance System: US leading NATO and Soviet Union leading Warsaw Pact.

Military Confrontation: The military forces of either superpower did not get directly engaged in sustained hostilities.

Strategic: Strategic balance was maintained between the United States and the Soviet Union as the Cold War period records no nuclear warfare following the policy of nuclear deterrence.

Spheres of influence: The United States extended its influence of West Europe and some regions of the 'Third World'. The Soviet Union's influence extended over Eastern Europe and also in some parts of the 'Third World'.

Global Stability or Instability: Apparently it seemed that the balance of power was maintained between the superpowers during the Cold War and the situation was considered to be a stable one. According to many scholars bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity and hence was the Cold War period.

Regional Stability or Instability: In Europe there prevailed military and strategic balance between the superpowers, hence the situation could be considered as a stable one with the exceptions of Polish, Hungarian, Czech or Berlin Wall crises as isolated, fluctuating points in stability.

In Third World a dubious situation prevailed as the superpowers got involved in the regional politics. Although no direct war broke out between US and Soviet Union, they got engaged in regional wars such as in Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan as well as in regional conflicts in Middle East, Africa or in Latin America through alliance formation or non structural direct/ indirect support . So efficacy of the regional balance of power maintained in the Third World by the superpowers during the Cold War is always in question.

Summary

The cold war remained cold for half a century in spite of the fact that the world had never seen such a big number of military troops in a confronting posture day after day along the borders of the Iron Curtain. Neither did we see the actual use of military power in Europe or the use of nuclear weapons. So far hard power achieved something that could never have been achieved by diplomacy. The threats from the communist empire were contained and countered. The military conflicts in other parts of the world were many but in Europe there were none. In Europe where the core and the origin of the conflict between East and West was established after World War II in the shape of the Iron Curtain, peace prevailed due to military power. And the war that everyone feared would come never did. And even if the conflicts in the rest of the world were many they were never allowed to spread and to emerge as global conflicts. They were regional and they were kept regional, may that have been in Korea, Vietnam, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Angola, or the Middle East. Even if they were part of a global pattern they remained regional. Due to a balance of power and diplomacy the world succeeded to uphold world peace, at the cost of peace in some of its non-European regions but still, in contrast to the threats to global stability.

The question is that why the superpowers got engaged in regional conflicts (in third world) and failed to maintain the regional balance of power, despite maintaining peace in Europe and sustaining the global balance of power? Or whether in this apparent anarchic scenario peace and stability prevailed in the regions of Asia, Africa or Middle East there by maintaining the balance of power? Such questions remain oft disputed as different scholars provide with different viewpoints. It is important to explore the situations prevailing in the South Eastern Asian region during the Cold War and tries to seek answer to such questions as whether the balance of power was maintained between the United States and the Soviet Union amidst this anarchy-stability scenario of the Cold War days.

However, the critics of realist notion of alliance and balance of power, i.e. liberal and neoliberal viewpoints argue that there prevailed an international community based on peace and cooperation amidst the geopolitics of the Cold War scenario that maintained stability in world politics. This cooperative society was formed as result of the emerging roles of various intergovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations whose roles will be discussed in the following chapter.